by: david-james

person

when a man attributes a deed to a role, office, corporate body, or other mask, he presents the mask as though it did the deed, however, liability never leaves the man, because the mask is an idea, that of a person; every deed is done by a man or woman;

a 'lawyer' pretends a natural person is real;
he personates it, and calls it a he or she;
a person is an it; it is impotent, without life; there is always a man at the end of the chain to complete the illusion;

feign a person to mask the man

“Man is a concept of biology and physiology, in short, of the natural sciences. Person is a concept of jurisprudence, of the analysis of legal norms.”

Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1949), p. 94;

person - Black’s

in Black’s fourth edition, the editors describe person through rank, rights and duties, and distinguish natural from artificial persons; historical sources for rank and status;

summary; in Black’s terminology, person is the general category; artificial and natural are the kinds within it;

  • person; in the opening definition, a man considered through his rank in society and the rights and duties attached to the place he holds;
  • natural person; a man considered as having legal rights and duties;
  • artificial person; a constructed legal subject, such as a corporation, to which man kind attribute rights and duties;

exact wording; the editors write:

“Persons” are of two kinds, natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties.

Black’s Law Dictionary, revised fourth edition (1968), PERSON, printed p. 1300;

further down the same page, citing Pollock and Gray:

A person is such, not because he is human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to him. The person is the legal subject or substance of which the rights and duties are attributes. An individual human being considered as having such attributes is what lawyers call a natural person.

Black’s, p. 1300; Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 110; Gray, Nature and Sources of Law, chapter II;

reading the wording; legal subject means the bearer to which rights and duties are ascribed; object of attribution describes the direction of that attribution; in the opening definition, the conceptual element lies in how the man is considered;

source: Black’s Law Dictionary, revised fourth edition (1968), PERSON, printed pp. 1299–1300;

person - Blackstone

summary; William Blackstone divided persons into natural and artificial; he used natural persons for man kind, and artificial persons for the devised corporations or bodies politic;

“Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us”

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, chapter I, *123; Sharswood edition (1893);

of artificial persons, he wrote “created and devised by human laws”, calling them corporations or bodies politic; he then distinguished absolute rights belonging to individuals from relative rights arising through membership of society and relations with others; his account includes both individual and social relations;

source: Blackstone, Book I, chapter I, first edition (1765), p. 119; the corresponding passage is at *123 in later editions;

person - Kelsen

summary of Kelsen’s account; the person is the personification of legal rights and duties concerning the conduct of man kind; those rights and duties are conceived and represented as a single legal subject;

the natural person concerns the conduct of one and the same man; the corporate person concerns conduct organised through shared rules; Hans Kelsen treats both as juristic constructions;

“The physical (natural) person is, thus, no natural reality but a construction of juristic thinking.”

Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1949), p. 96;

page application; the distinction is between the man and the constructed person; he or she refers to the man; it refers to the construction; the man does the deed;

Kelsen: the person, rights and duties, and the man who does the deed

the explanation below follows Kelsen’s analysis of the legal person in chapter IX; it is a paraphrase except where his exact words are quoted; legal norms here means rules concerning conduct described as required, permitted or authorised;

the imagined bearer — p. 93

Kelsen begins with a habit of thought: when man kind describe qualities, they imagine something which possesses them; in jurisprudence, they describe rights and duties and then imagine a bearer which has them; that bearer is called a person;

his criticism concerns counting two things: the rights and duties, and an additional entity supposedly possessing them; in his analysis, the person is the unity in which those rights and duties are collected and personified; personification presents the collection as a single subject;

personification — the OED and Kelsen

word source; in the OED, sense 1 of personification concerns representing a thing or abstraction as a person; under sense 1b, the editors wrote:

An imaginary or ideal person conceived as representing a thing or abstraction.

Oxford English Dictionary, corrected re-issue (1933), vol. VII, p. 728, personification, sense 1b; the definitions and matching 1933 facsimiles;

connection; in Kelsen’s account, the rights and duties are the abstractions being personified; they are collected and represented as a single legal subject; the man is the one whose conduct is considered; the imagined person is the representation of that collection;

the man and the natural person — pp. 94–96

for the natural person, the connecting element is the conduct of one and the same man; the relevant norms are collected and their unity is presented as his legal personality;

the description concerns particular conduct; the man’s whole existence, bodily functions and mental life extend beyond that description; the man is the one whose conduct is considered, while the natural person is the personification used in the legal account of that conduct;

why he changes “has” to “is” — p. 95

To avoid this nonsense, we have to interpret the “has” as “is”:

Kelsen, p. 95;

once person means the personified collection of rights and duties, saying that the person has rights and duties says that the collection possesses its own contents; Kelsen calls that statement meaningless or an empty tautology; his more precise account is that the person is those rights and duties, presented as a unity;

natural and corporate person — pp. 96, 99–101

Kelsen treats both as juristic constructions; for the natural person, the norms concern one and the same man; for the corporate person, the unity comes from an organisation expressed through rules concerning the conduct of several of man kind;

he retains a narrower technical use of juristic person when discussing corporations; he also treats person as an auxiliary concept which may be used to describe the arrangement; his criticism of the statement that a person has rights and duties is part of that explanation;

attribution and the deed — pp. 97–100

“And indeed acts of a juristic person are always acts of human beings designated as acts of a juristic person.”

Kelsen, p. 97;

a man does the deed; his conduct is considered under the relevant rules, and that deed is then described as a deed of the corporation; Kelsen calls this attribution imputation; in this use, the deed is referred to the organised whole represented as a person;

in his account, the general legal rules and the internal corporate rules are considered together: the required conduct is specified, and the particular man who is to perform it is determined through the corporate organisation;

the building example and liability — pp. 97, 101–103

in Kelsen’s example, a man concludes a building purchase under the specified corporate authority; the purchase gives rise to a payment obligation, while the internal corporate rules determine which man is to arrange payment from the corporate property; the explanation concerns the conduct of man kind and the rules governing its attribution;

Kelsen separately discusses the allocation of liability and the property against which a claim may be enforced; his corporate example includes liability limited to corporate property; the man who does the deed and the property available to satisfy a legal obligation are separate questions in his account;

subject, object and personification — reading pp. 93–96 together

subject of rights and duties names their supposed bearer; object of attribution describes the direction in which they are attributed; Kelsen’s further question concerns what that bearer is; his answer is the personification formed by treating the relevant norms as one whole;

working definition drawn from his account; person: a set of legal rights and duties concerning the conduct of man kind, conceived and represented as a single legal subject;

source: Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg, 1949 printing, chapter IX, “The Legal Person”, printed pp. 93–103; related source passages;

source: Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1949), chapter IX, printed pp. 93–103;

why the person fails

it is a concept of jurisprudence;
a person has no existence in nature;

a man exists in nature;
a man does the conceiving;

a man describes rights and duties;

a man pretends to animate the description;

Black’s; considering a man according to rank supplies no second body;
Kelsen; personifying rights and duties supplies no second body;
Blackstone; calling a man a natural person supplies no second body;

a person cannot itself think, speak, decide, write or sign; it is inanimate;
a man does every deed;

every deed attributed to the person is done by man kind;
personification does not replace the man that does the deed;

the feigning of person

a 1609 OED quotation calls prosopopoeia “the feigning of a person”;

“our selues doe take their person vpon vs, or giue voice vnto senselesse things”;

1609 quotation under prosopopoeia; source image in the evidence below;

personation: a character assumed by a man; prosopopoeia: an imaginary or absent person, or a thing, presented as doing a deed; personification: the later gloss;

statements and attribution

statements classified as personating or prosopopoeia
falsehoods feigning of person
“I am a constable.” personating; constable is a role, a mask, a fiction;
“The Police force detained you.” prosopopoeia; 'Police force' is presented as though it did the deed; Police force is fiction
“The Chief Constable authorised me.” prosopopoeia; Chief Constable is defined as a corporation sole, a fiction; a fiction can not authorise;
“My warrant card gives me authority.” prosopopoeia; the card is presented as though it gives authority;
“HMCTS requires attendance / HMRC says £1,000 is owed.” prosopopoeia; the masks HMCTS and HMRC are presented as though they require or speak;
“The Court ordered / decided.” prosopopoeia; the mask, Court, is presented as though it ordered or decided;
“A man is prosecuted by the Police force.” prosopopoeia; 'Police force' is presented as though it prosecuted; the mask: 'Police force' hides the deeds of man kind;

falsehood, deceit and fraud

the use of prosopopoeia or personating to mask a role, legal person, company, corporation, corporation sole, or office as a separately existing person is falsehood;

falsehood;
the feigned person, a fiction, is presented as fact, and a deed is falsely attributed to the fiction, not the man;
deceit;
the man knowingly uses that false appearance to mislead another man;
fraud;
the man uses that deceit for unjust gain or advantage, such as payment, compliance, attendance, surrender, process, control;

where man kind use artificial persons as masks for their deeds in society or government to obtain compliance or control, the falsehood is the means, deceit is its knowing use, and fraud is the deed;

Oxford English Dictionary entry for falsehood, subsense b, recording that which is contrary to fact or truth.
OED 1933, Volume IV, page 50; falsehood, subsense b;

conclusion

by personation, a man pretends he is the mask; by prosopopoeia, he gives voice to the feigned person or attributes a deed to it; the feigned person is his mask; the man does the deed; liability never leaves the man;

evidence

source images and records;

OED word evidence
Oxford English Dictionary entry for prosopopoeia, including the definition, the expression feigning of a person, and a 1609 quotation.
OED 1933, Volume VIII, page 1493; the 1609 source for “the feigning of a person”;

the images contain the headwords, selected senses, dates, and spelling; the definitions below are short working summaries, not replacements for the complete entries;

Oxford English Dictionary entry for prosopopey with a 1577 quotation about those brought in to speak who do not speak.
OED 1933, Volume VIII, page 1493; obsolete English prosopopey and the 1577 quotation;
Oxford English Dictionary 1933 facsimile for represent, verb 1, sense 2a, defining bringing something clearly and distinctly before the mind by description or imagination.
OED 1933, Volume VIII, page 479; represent, v. 1, sense 2a; this sense records description or imagination and does not determine whether what is represented accords with fact; open at full size;
Oxford English Dictionary headword for personate, verb. Oxford English Dictionary selected definition of personate, including official representation and standing in the place of another.
OED 1933, Volume VII, page 728; personate, selected sense;
Oxford English Dictionary entry for feign, including etymology and selected senses.
OED 1933, Volume IV, page 137; feign, selected source record;
Oxford English Dictionary evidence for forge, with selected senses concerning fabrication and counterfeit making joined by an ellipsis.
OED 1933, Volume IV, page 450; selected forge senses are joined by an ellipsis;
word families and working sequence

these form overlapping word families rather than one strict etymological chain;

word families and short meanings
wordshort meaning
personateto play or assume a character; to pass oneself off as another person; in OED sense 6, now rare or obsolete, to represent vicariously or officially; in rare sense 7, to represent a thing as a person; state the sense used;
personatingthe action expressed by personate; on this page, the deed of the man who personates;
personationthe action of personating; recorded senses include assuming or passing oneself off as another person, dramatic representation, and embodiment; the word alone does not prove deceit;
personifyto represent a thing or abstraction as a person, or attribute personal characteristics to it;
personificationthe attribution of personal form, nature, or characteristics, or representation of a thing or abstraction as a person; the later English gloss for the second sense of prosopopoeia, not a separate stage;
prosopopeyobsolete English form of prosopopoeia;
prosopopoeiaa rhetorical figure by which an imaginary or absent person is represented as speaking or acting; also one by which an inanimate or abstract thing is represented as a person or with personal characteristics;
feignfrom Middle English through Old French feindre and Latin fingere, “form, mould, feign”; senses include fashion or form, invent, represent in fiction, imagine, disguise, and pretend; no compulsory sequence runs through the senses;
feigningthe action of feign; in a rare sub-sense the OED records “feigning of person: personification”;
fayning / feyninghistorical spellings of feigning; the cited 1561 quotation has fayning and the 1609 quotation has feigning;
feigned personworking description for the name, role, office, or thing presented as though it spoke or did the deed; no person or being is produced;
fictionin OED sense 3b, something imaginatively invented: a feigned existence, event, or state; invention opposed to fact; sense 3a allows invention for deception or otherwise;
figmentsomething moulded or fashioned, an invented statement or story, or a notion framed in the mind, according to the selected sense;
forge / forgingin the relevant senses, to fabricate a false or imaginary account, or make something spurious to pass as genuine; a separate word family from feign, fiction, and figment;
falsehoodwhat is presented does not accord with fact or what is true;
deceitworking use: a man knowingly uses falsehood, false appearance, or a concealed fact to mislead another man;

the useful working sequence; select each word only where the words and deed establish it;

  1. personation; where a man personates, his deed is personation;
  2. prosopopoeia; where a man presents an imaginary or absent person as speaking or acting, or an inanimate or abstract thing as a person, the representation is prosopopoeia;
  3. feigned person; the apparent person presented by the words is described here as the feigned person;
  4. falsehood; where what is presented does not accord with fact or what is true, it is falsehood;
  5. deceit; where a man knowingly uses the falsehood, false appearance, or concealed fact to mislead another man, his deed is deceit;

“forging a false person” is the stronger applied description where a man fabricates a false person-representation, or makes a spurious representation to pass as genuine; it is not an OED expression or a necessary stage; the older source expression for the basic device is “feigning of person”;

the false separate doer is falsehood; knowing use of that false appearance to mislead is deceit; use of the deceit for gain, advantage, payment, compliance, attendance, surrender, process, control, or loss is fraud;

official source evidence

these sources record the institutional words and arrangements used in the examples; they do not replace the factual question: which man spoke, wrote, decided, demanded, touched, stopped, bound, or took?

Police force and constable

Police Act 1996, section 2 records that a Police force shall be maintained for every police area listed in Schedule 1;

section 29 contains attestation as a constable by making the declaration in Schedule 4; its words include causing the peace to be kept and preserved, and preventing offences against people and property;

British citizen

on 30 October 1981, man kind in Parliament enacted provisions for the statutory status called British citizen in the British Nationality Act 1981; those provisions came into operation on 1 January 1983 under article 2 of the Commencement Order; the earlier status called citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies came into operation on 1 January 1949 under section 1 and section 34(2) of the British Nationality Act 1948; the ordinary expression “British citizen” is older and appears in Hansard on 1 February 1900;

HMCTS

on the official HMCTS page, man kind have written of Court and tribunal administration, work with an independent judiciary, and staff employed by HMCTS;

prosopopoeia; HMCTS is presented as though it required attendance;

HMRC and Court

on the official HMRC page, man kind describe the department, the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, and commissioners appointed by the King;

prosopopoeia; HMRC is presented as though it spoke; Court is presented as though it ordered or decided;

man kind may use statutory wording to attribute a function, decision, power, or deed to a name; this page returns the observable deed to the man without pretending that every named structure has the same recorded form;

person considered by rank or status

man kind have long described one another through attributed rank, civil standing, and family position; the dates below mark recorded treatments of those descriptions; the first use remains undated;

about A.D. 160–161 — Gaius

in Book I, paragraphs 9–12 of his Institutes, Gaius distinguished free from enslaved, freeborn from freed, and different citizenship conditions; in paragraph 48, he distinguished those independent of another’s authority from those subject to it; he therefore arranged his account of the law of persons around attributed conditions and relations; this is early evidence of the practice, rather than the later English definition in Black’s;

Gaius, Institutes, Book I, paragraphs 9–12 and 48, translated by Edward Poste; Tony Honoré, “Gaius (2), Roman jurist”, for the dating of the lectures to A.D. 160–161;

1725 — Heineccius: person considered with a status

in Elementa juris civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum, first published in 1725, Johann Gottlieb Heineccius distinguished homo from persona and wrote in paragraph 75:

“Persona est homo, cum statu quodam consideratus.”

translation; a person is a man considered with a certain status;

in paragraph 76, he described status as a quality according to which man kind used different rights, and divided civil status into freedom, citizenship, and family position;

Heineccius, Book I, title III, paragraphs 75–76; wording checked in a later scanned edition, printed page 43 and page 44; Carlo Bersani, “Persona, Homo, Res: Building a Boundary in Early Modern European Legal Thought”, section IV, for the 1725 publication date and earlier context;

1765 — Blackstone: natural persons and their relations

William Blackstone used natural persons in his distinction between natural and artificial persons; he wrote:

“Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us”

he then distinguished absolute rights belonging to individuals from relative rights arising through membership of society and relations with others; his phrase natural persons therefore needs its own context when compared with the description of a man according to rank;

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, chapter I, first edition (1765), page 119; the corresponding passage is at *123 in later editions;

1856 — Bouvier: person considered by rank

under PERSON, John Bouvier wrote:

“In law, man and person are not exactly synonymous terms.”

he described a person as a man considered according to his rank in society, together with the rights and duties attached to that position; he cited his Institutes of American Law, paragraph 137; his examples included citizenship, birth, and domestic relations;

John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, revised sixth edition (1856), PERSON, paragraphs 1 and 6–8;

Black’s fourth edition — the rank wording

in the revised fourth edition (1968), the editors began PERSON on page 1299 with:

“A man considered according to the rank he holds in society”

on page 1300, under PERSONA EST HOMO CUM STATU QUODAM CONSIDERATUS, they also cited Heineccius, Book I, title III, paragraph 75; this supplies an express connection to his status definition; the dated examples above record related descriptions, without establishing that each author borrowed from the preceding author;

Black’s Law Dictionary, revised fourth edition (1968), printed pages 1299–1300;

the origin of the imaginary person

in the Oxford English Dictionary (1933), under fiction, n., sense 5 and sub-sense a, “in Law”, a legal fiction is recorded as “a supposition known to be at variance with fact” but conventionally accepted for practical convenience, traditional usage, decorum, or a similar reason;

Oxford English Dictionary, corrected re-issue, Volume IV, F–G (1933), printed page 187, fiction, n., sense 5 and sub-sense a, “in Law”;

where the supposition and its boundary are openly stated, that differs from a concealed falsehood; it also differs from the later language of an artificial person, through which man kind attribute property, rights, duties, proceedings, or succession to one continuing name;

in Book IV, title VI, paragraphs 3–5 of the Institutes issued under Justinian in A.D. 533, it is written that a real action could proceed upon the fictitious allegation that title by usucapion had been completed when it had not; upon that recorded supposition, a man could seek a remedy although the required period had not run; this was fiction used as procedure, not the production of another being;

Justinian, Institutes, Book IV, title VI, paragraphs 3–5;

Roman rules for collective bodies developed separately; in the Roman sources, persona could describe a role or an individual, while a collective body was ordinarily described as universitas, corpus, or collegium; common property, representation, debts, and continuity could be attributed to that body despite changes among its members; from the twelfth century, lawyers and canonists worked these materials into more explicit accounts of collective continuity; in the thirteenth century, Innocent IV and later canonists used the language of persona ficta for corporate bodies; the modern technical legal person is therefore not merely the Roman theatre-mask carried forward unchanged;

Digest 3.4, concerning actions by and against a corporate body; Visa A. J. Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood, chapter 2;

in England, rules concerning endowed property held by an ecclesiastical office-holder and his successors existed before the settled name corporation sole; the formative difficulty concerned the parish parson or single chantry priest: lawyers disputed what estate the serving parson held, how land given to him and his successors passed to later incumbents, what he could alienate or charge, and where the fee rested during a vacancy; Blackstone later explained the mature doctrine by reference to descent, personal debts, and the inconvenience of fresh conveyances; surviving reports show disputed development rather than one proved moment of invention;

the earliest corporate language located by Frederic William Maitland is a 1448 plea concerning a chantry chaplain; a reported statement in 1482 treated an endowed priest and his successors as a corporation, but the possibility remained disputed in 1522; Sir Robert Broke later called the parson a corporation and a corporation in succession, although Maitland could not establish that Broke used the exact expression corporation sole; Coke’s 1614 report of the 1612 Case of Sutton’s Hospital, placed the King with the parson as a one-person body politic;

the Tudor distinction between the King’s natural and politic capacities developed through particular property and incapacity disputes; it overlapped with, but was not created by, the corporation-sole classification; later jurists described the Crown as a corporation sole in particular contexts and man kind later applied the classification to further single offices; in 1765 William Blackstone wrote that artificial persons were “created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government”, divided corporations into aggregate and sole, and supplied the mature explanation of perpetual succession;

Frederic William Maitland, “The Corporation Sole” (1900), and “The Crown as Corporation” (1901); Marie-France Fortin, “The king’s two bodies and the Crown a corporation sole” (2021); William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, chapter I, page 119, and chapter XVIII, pages 455–458;

“The honour of originally inventing these political constitutions entirely belongs to the Romans. They were introduced, as Plutarch says, by Numa;”

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, chapter XVIII, first-edition pages 456–457;

Numa is a name, not a device: Blackstone meant Numa Pompilius, whom Plutarch presented in a traditional account as the Sabine king chosen after Romulus;

in chapter 17 of the Life of Numa, Plutarch attributed to Numa the distribution of the people into groups according to their trades or arts; he listed musicians, goldsmiths, carpenters, dyers, leather-workers, curriers, braziers, and potters; he wrote that Numa grouped the remaining trades and “made one body out of all who belonged to them”; Plutarch presented the deed as a way to replace the larger Sabine-and-Roman division with smaller trade divisions;

Plutarch, Life of Numa, chapter 17.1–3, translated by Bernadotte Perrin (1914);

source boundary; Blackstone attributed the origin through Plutarch, and Plutarch attributed the grouping deed to Numa; Plutarch did not call those trade groups artificial persons: William Blackstone made that connection while writing the history of corporations; reading those words provides the traditional account given by those writers, not proof that Numa originated every later corporation, artificial person, or legal fiction;

in 1896 William Markby called the corporation sole a misnomer; in 1900 and 1901 Frederic William Maitland traced its church-property history and found no second person apart from the mortal office-holder; their disagreement with other jurists shows that fiction theory was one explanation of legal personality, not its entire history;

“After all, Coke’s corporation sole is a man: a man who fills an office … but a mortal man.”

Frederic William Maitland, “The Corporation Sole” (1900), in The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, volume III, page 238;

William Markby, Elements of Law, fifth edition (1896), sections 136–145, printed pages 84–90; Frederic William Maitland, “The Corporation Sole” (1900) and “The Crown as Corporation” (1901), in The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, volume III, pages 210–270;

during the nineteenth century, man kind in Parliament widened access to incorporation and limited liability; in the judgments delivered in Salomon in 1896 and reported in 1897, it is written that a duly incorporated company is distinct from its subscribers; in section 16(2) of the Companies Act 2006 it is written that the subscribers and later members “are a body corporate” under the registered name; through these written rules, man kind attribute property, debts, capacity, proceedings, and succession to that name;

Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22; Companies Act 2006, section 16;

legal person

as a present-day example, in HMRC’s VAT Registration Manual it is written that a legal person is “an entity or body which has an existence separate and distinct from the persons … comprising that entity or body”; corporate bodies, corporations sole, Scottish partnerships, and European Economic Interest Groupings are given as examples;

HMRC, VAT Registration Manual, VATREG02100, “Basic principles of registration: meaning of person”;

body corporate and body politic

the distinction; body corporate and body politic are not two opposite kinds; their written meaning depends upon the source and context, and historical sources sometimes use the expressions for the same corporation;

  1. body corporate; in the current UK legislative-drafting guidance, man kind distinguish a body with members from a corporation sole; examples expressly described as bodies corporate include a registered company, a limited liability partnership, a county or district council, an NHS trust, and a charitable incorporated organisation;
  2. corporation sole; in that guidance, man kind describe an office held by a single individual; for the Companies Acts, in section 1173 it is written that “body corporate” and “corporation” do not include a corporation sole; in section 7 it is written that one or more persons may form a company, and in section 16 the subscriber or subscribers and later members are described as the body corporate; that is distinct from a continuing incorporated office;
  3. body politic; William Blackstone, a man, used the expression historically for an artificial person or corporation; it has also been used for a political community, state, or attributed public capacity; it is therefore neither a universal modern synonym for body corporate nor its opposite;
  4. body politic and corporate; both expressions have been written together for one body; examples include the historical General Board of Health, rectors of new Manchester parishes, the Council of the Durham Colleges, and the Institution of Chemical Engineers in a 2024 Privy Council charter instrument;

application; body politic is a written classification; it does not produce another natural body or another man; a man does the deed, while man kind may use a written rule to attribute legal consequences to a body-name or continuing office-name;

source boundary; the legislative-drafting guidance records current drafting practice rather than one universal definition; section 1173 is expressly limited to the Companies Acts; Blackstone, older enactments, and charter instruments record their own historical or particular uses;