by: david-james

Acts of Parliament

Acts of Parliament and man kind;
“Two men have no more natural right to exercise any kind of authority over one, than one has to exercise the same authority over two.”
Lysander Spooner, No Treason, No. 1 (1867), section II, first argument;

man kind write every word of an Act of Parliament; man kind debate, vote, print and publish it; yet the opening words attribute enactment to a corporate person; man can not communicate with that idea;

“Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, …”

Blackstone describes the king in royal political capacity together with the three estates as the “great corporation or body politic of the kingdom”; in Book I, chapter XVIII, he describes corporations or bodies politic as artificial persons; Blackstone; the enacting words and their variants;

false dealing

a man does the deed; by representing or personating an idea, he conceals that the deed is his; the person has no independent body or will and performs no deed; that is false dealing and is examined here;

  1. the words and their ownership; man kind write the words; copyright is attributed to Crown;
  2. licence; who or what gives permission; who or what is “you”;
  3. man kind and the artificial person; man kind assemble; the collective description is body politic;
  4. consent and the deed; consent is attributed; a man claims the right to compel another;

1. the words and their ownership

man kind devise, write and publish the words; in section 164(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, man kind wrote that “Her Majesty is entitled to copyright in every Act of Parliament”; they describe that entitlement as Crown copyright; the written entitlement;

Crown is a concept, an idea; the royal office is described as a corporation sole; Blackstone describes corporate succession as a kind of “legal immortality”; the man dies; the devised succession continues; the royal office; Blackstone on succession;

2. licence

who or what gives permission;

man kind write the licence terms, administer the permissions and publish the documents in Crown’s name; Crown is a Corporation Sole, a concept; every deed remains the deed of man kind; Crown copyright and licensing;

an idea can neither write the words nor give permission; attributing those deeds to the idea as though it performed them is a falsehood;

who or what is “you”;

in version 3.0 of the Open Government Licence, the writers address “you” as a natural or legal person, or a body of persons; the recipient is described through legal personality; the licence definitions;

definitions

Open Government Licence v3.0 definition: 'You', 'you' and 'your' means the natural or legal person, or body of persons corporate or incorporate, acquiring rights in the Information (whether the Information is obtained directly from the Licensor or otherwise) under this licence.
Open Government Licence v3.0, definition of “You”; source; select the image to enlarge;

Kelsen treats natural as well as corporate personality as a juristic construction; the person represents rights and duties concerning the conduct of man kind; person and the man;

application; the constructed person can neither understand the terms nor agree to them; a man reads, copies, publishes, agrees or refuses; presenting the person as though it independently did any of those deeds is the falsehood examined here;

man kind write the words;
man kind write the claim of ownership;
man kind administer the permission;

what did the particular man do, what permission did he rely upon, and what acceptance is actually evidenced; use and acceptance; misrepresentation and falsehood;

3. man kind and the artificial person

clergy, barons and knights, and commons; these are the original English estates described by the OED editors; the final arrangement they record is lords spiritual, lords temporal, and commons; man kind are classified by standing, rank and participation in government; the estates; /society;

Blackstone describes the king in royal political capacity and those three estates together as the body politic; he describes bodies politic as artificial persons; man kind assemble, speak and vote; the artificial person does none of those deeds; Blackstone’s descriptions;

man kind do the deeds; the following names describe the persons, ranks and capacities attributed to them;

man kind, the imagined person, rank or capacity, and the source evidence
man kind doing the deedsimagined person, rank or capacityevidence
a man holding the royal office King/Crown in official capacity: corporation sole; personification of constitutional powers; royal office;
a man holding the episcopal office and participating in Parliament bishop in episcopal office: corporation sole; parliamentary capacity: Lord Spiritual; bishop and succession;
a man participating under a peerage Lord Temporal; peerage, parliamentary rank and membership; peerage and admission;
a man elected to participate in Parliament MP; representative parliamentary capacity in the Commons assembled; election and participation;
man kind assembled in those capacities the composite body politic; king in royal political capacity and the three estates together; king and three estates;

in the ordinary enacting formula, man kind write:

“by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled”

man kind give the advice, speak their consent and record the votes; the words name the capacities in which they participate; the formula and its variants;

the devised arrangement

man kind devise the offices, ranks, succession and representation; man kind maintain the arrangement; art is used here in the sense of contrivance; the OED wording;

4. consent and the deed

Thomas Smith wrote that parliamentary consent is taken as each man’s consent; Blackstone described participation through representatives in the contemplation of law; Smith and Blackstone;

Jonathan Swift wrote in his fourth Drapier’s Letter (1724):

“All government without the consent of the governed, is the very definition of slavery.”

the OED editors record Swift’s words under slavery, sense 3c: “A state of subjection or subordination comparable to that of a slave; also with pl., an instance of this.”; OED 1933: definition and Swift quotation;

application; attributed consent does not establish that the particular man agreed;

the grounds offered for political power have been disputed by man kind; consent, representation and necessity are examined in the arguments of Locke, Hume and Spooner and the parliamentary debates;

who does the deed;

a man stops another man, enters his home, searches him or uses force; the decision and the deed remain with the man who does them; the debate on compulsory powers; forcement;

naming an Act, Crown or office does not explain what justifies that particular deed; the man relying upon it must account for his own deed;

you rely upon an Act of Parliament; what deed do you propose to do to another man, and what justifies it;

research and source detail

the argument above concerns the attribution of deeds and consent; the dropdowns below contain the source wording, historical context and competing accounts;

OED: estate, rank and the three estates

in the OED, estate, n., sense 6a, the editors describe an order or class regarded as part of the body politic, participating in government directly or through representatives; they give the English estates originally as clergy, barons and knights, and commons; after various fluctuations, the final arrangement was lords spiritual, lords temporal, and commons;

in sense 3a, they record standing and rank; in sense 7a, they describe use of “the (three) estates of the realm” for Crown, the House of Lords and the House of Commons as a misuse; the three estates and the three legislative powers are distinct enumerations; OED: estate, transcription and facsimiles; the discussion on /society;

return to man kind and the artificial person;

Erskine May: author, publication and parliamentary use

Thomas Erskine May published the first edition of A Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament in 1844; he was then an assistant in the House of Commons library and later became Clerk of the House; he prepared nine editions, and later editors continued the work; publication history and use;

The editors describe parliamentary procedures, their development, and the constitutional conventions followed by participants in the Commons and Lords; Speakers cite the work in rulings, and members refer to it during debate; the online text is available through the Parliament website;

The twenty-fifth edition was published in 2019; its named editors are Sir David Natzler and Mark Hutton, supported by assistant editors with experience as parliamentary clerks; in his preface, Natzler explains the introduction of numbered paragraphs and the arrangements for online updates; editors; preface;

The references used above are paragraph 25.25 on the introduction of Lords Temporal, paragraph 13.12 on proceedings in Parliament, and paragraph 26.9 on the enacting formula; further detail appears in the dropdowns below;

return to the participating structure; return to advice and consent;

the enacting formula: advice, consent and the recorded variants

In Erskine May, paragraph 26.9, the editors describe the enacting formula as the paragraph placed before the clauses of a bill and date its development to the fifteenth century; in the ordinary wording they name the monarch, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons assembled in Parliament; the version reproduced there uses the title Queen; paragraph 26.9;

They also record additional financial wording for Supply and Appropriation and Finance Bills; in that wording the Commons' responsibility for granting money or duties is expressed;

For the procedure under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the writers specify an enacting formula naming the monarch and the Commons and expressly referring to those Acts; the prescribed words are recorded in section 4 of the Parliament Act 1911;

Examples can be read in the introductions to the Energy Act 2013, with the ordinary formula, and the Hunting Act 2004, with the Parliament Acts formula;

return to advice and consent;

the royal office and corporation sole: the 2025 judgment

Lord Reed and Lord Burrows connect the Sovereign’s official capacity to the enacting words in paragraphs 40–45 of X v The Lord Advocate [2025] UKSC 44; the royal office is discussed here as a corporation sole; the Energy Act 2023 enacting words;

In X v The Lord Advocate [2025] UKSC 44, dated 10 December 2025, Lord Reed and Lord Burrows wrote the judgment, with Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs and Lady Simler agreeing; the legal question concerned vicarious liability for alleged wrongdoing by a Scottish judicial office-holder; judgment;

In paragraph 40 they describe corporation sole in terms of a single office-holder and perpetual succession; they connect this description with continuity of the royal office and distinguish the monarch's private and public capacities; their cited authorities include Sutton's Hospital (1611) and Attorney General v Köhler (1861);

In paragraph 41 they explain that, in some contexts, Crown means the Sovereign in official capacity; in paragraph 45 they discuss legislative and judicial functions, including the monarch's place in the enacting formula;

return to the opening; return to the participating structure;

Blackstone: the estates, body politic and corporations sole

In Book I, chapter 2, page 149, William Blackstone writes that the three estates are the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal and Commons; he describes the King in royal political capacity together with those estates as the body politic of the kingdom; his account is an eighteenth-century description of the parliamentary arrangement; chapter 2, Of the Parliament;

On page 151 he describes the constitutional parts as connected through an arrangement of mutual checks; on pages 154–155 he describes election through particular districts and the elected member's service for the whole realm;

In Book I, chapter 18, pages 455–456, Blackstone introduces artificial persons, bodies politic and corporations through the continuation of rights across successive holders, describing a kind of “legal immortality”; on page 457 he distinguishes corporations aggregate, comprising several members, from corporations sole, comprising one holder and successors in a particular station; chapter 18, Of Corporations;

His examples of corporations sole include the King, a bishop, a parson and a vicar; on page 458 he explains succession to parsonage rights and continuity of the royal office;

the development of corporation sole and its use for continuity of title is examined on /parson and /person; the related page argument about an imaginary device and title is distinct from Blackstone’s quoted descriptions;

return to the participating structure; return to the connection to art;

Lords Temporal: life peerage, letters patent and admission

In section 1 of the Life Peerages Act 1958, man kind wrote of conferring a peerage for life by letters patent; in subsection (2), the specified incidents include the rank of baron under the style appointed in the letters patent and, subject to the stated qualification, receipt of writs of summons and participation by sitting and voting in the House of Lords; the peerage expires on the holder's death; section 1;

In Erskine May, paragraph 25.25, the editors describe introduction between two supporting members; at the Table, the herald hands the letters patent to the Reading Clerk, and the new member hands over the writ of summons;

The Reading Clerk reads the letters patent and administers the oath or affirmation; the new member signs the Test Roll and an undertaking to abide by the Code of Conduct, then proceeds to the Woolsack to shake hands with the Lord Speaker; paragraph 25.25;

return to the participating structure;

Commons and MPs: representation and participation in proceedings

Blackstone describes members elected through particular districts and returned to Parliament, with service for the whole realm; this account appears in Book I, chapter 2, pages 154–155; Blackstone's account of representation;

In Erskine May, paragraph 13.12, the editors explain the parliamentary use of proceedings in terms of formal collective business and decisions; they describe individual participation through speech, voting, giving notice of a motion, and presenting a petition or a committee report; paragraph 13.12;

In the same passage they describe parliamentary officers carrying out orders and members of the public participating by giving evidence or securing presentation of a petition; the paragraph's references include parliamentary journals, committee reports and judgments concerning parliamentary privilege;

return to the participating structure;

the OED entries: art and forcement

Under art, noun, sense 14, the readable OED transcription is: “An artifice, contrivance, stratagem, wile, trick, cunning device. Chiefly in pl.”; the corresponding 1933 printed entry is in volume I, page 468, with the headword and etymology on page 467; art: transcription and facsimile;

Under forcement, noun, sense 3, the definition is: “Compulsion; also, a compelling motive.”; the 1933 entry is in volume IV, page 422; the dagger marks this sense as obsolete, and the illustrative quotation is dated 1524; forcement: transcription and facsimile;

The readable entries on the linked OED page follow the electronic OED2 transcription; each entry has separate image crops for the headword and the printed sense, together with its bibliographical reference;

return to the opening; return to the connection to art;

Hansard: representation in 1843 and compulsory powers in 1984

On 18 May 1843, Sharman Crawford sought leave to introduce a bill concerning fuller representation and shorter Parliaments; in his speech he quoted Thomas Smith on parliamentary consent and Blackstone on the King and estates; he then questioned how adequately the existing Commons represented the population under the franchise of that time; the proposed leave was rejected, with 32 voting for and 101 against; Hansard, Parliamentary Reform, 18 May 1843;

On 14 May 1984, during consideration of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, Douglas Hurd moved a clause concerning reasonable force in the exercise of police powers; he gave examples involving compulsory fingerprinting, entry under a search warrant and searches of arrested suspects;

Gerald Bermingham supported a narrower amendment and argued for strict limits; Robert Maclennan also criticised the breadth of the proposal; the amendment was rejected and the new clause was added to the bill; Hansard, Power of Constable to Use Reasonable Force, 14 May 1984;

return to the historical disagreement; return to compulsory power;

Lysander Spooner: A Letter to Thomas F. Bayard (1882) — complete letter

source: Lysander Spooner, A Letter to Thomas F. Bayard: Challenging his Right—and that of all the Other So-called Senators and Representatives in Congress—to Exercise any Legislative Power whatever over the People of the United States; Boston: published by the author, 1882; letter dated 27 May 1882; Collected Works, entry T.34;

the author’s text follows; spelling, punctuation and wording are preserved from the collected transcription;

LETTER
To Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware:

Sir,—

I have read your letter to Rev. Lyman Abbott, in which you express the opinion that it is at least possible for a man to be a legislator, (under the Constitution of the United States,) and yet be an honest man.

This proposition implies that you hold it to be at least possible that some four hundred men should, by some process or other, become invested with the right to make laws of their own—that is, laws wholly of their own device, and therefore necessarily distinct from the law of nature, or the principles of natural justice; and that these laws of their own making shall be really and truly obligatory upon the people of the United States; and that, therefore, the people may rightfully be compelled to obey them.

All this implies that you are of the opinion that the Congress of the United States, of which you are a member, has, by some process or other, become possessed of some right of arbitrary dominion over the people of the United States; which right of arbitrary dominion is not given by, and is, therefore, necessarily in conflict with, the law of nature, the principles of natural justice, and the natural rights of men, as individuals. All this is necessarily implied in the idea that the Congress now possesses any right whatever to make any laws whatever, of its own device—that is, any laws that shall be either more, less, or other than that natural law, which it can neither make, unmake, nor alter—and cause them to be enforced upon the people of the United States, or any of them, against their will.

You assume that the right of arbitrary dominion—that is, [4] the right of making laws of their own device, and compelling obedience to them—is a “trust” that has been delegated to those who now exercise that power. You call it “the trust of public power.”

But, Sir, you are mistaken in supposing that any such power has ever been delegated, or ever can be delegated, by any body, to any body.

Any such delegation of power is naturally impossible, for these reasons, viz:—

1. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrary dominion over himself; for that would be giving himself away as a slave. And this no one can do. Any contract to do so is necessarily an absurd one, and has no validity. To call such a contract a “Constitution,” or by any other high-sounding name, does not alter its character as an absurd and void contract.

2. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrary dominion over a third person; for that would imply a right in the first person, not only to make the third person his slave, but also a right to dispose of him as a slave to still other persons. Any contract to do this is necessarily a criminal one, and therefore invalid. To call such a contract a “Constitution” does not at all lessen its criminality, or add to its validity.

These facts, that no man can delegate, or give away, his own natural right to liberty, nor any other man’s natural right to liberty, prove that he can delegate no right of arbitrary dominion whatever—or, what is the same thing, no legislative power whatever—over himself or any body else, to any man, or body of men.

This impossibility of any man’s delegating any legislative power whatever necessarily results from the fact, that the law of nature has drawn the line, and the only line—and that, too, [5] a line that can never be effaced nor removed—between each man’s own inherent and inalienable rights of person and property, and each and every other man’s inherent and inalienable rights of person and property. It, therefore, necessarily fixes the unalterable limits, within which every man may rightfully seek his own happiness, in his own way, free from all responsibility to, or interference by, his fellow men, or any of them.

All this pretended delegation of legislative power—that is, of a power, on the part of the legislators, so-called, to make any laws of their own device, distinct from the law of nature—is therefore an entire falsehood; a falsehood, whose only purpose is to cover and hide a pure usurpation, by one body of men, of arbitrary dominion over other men.

That this legislative power, or power of arbitrary dominion, is a pure usurpation, on the part of those who now exercise it, and not “a trust” delegated to them, is still further proved by the fact that the only delegation of power, that is even professed or pretended to be made, is made secretly—that is, by secret ballot—and not in any open and authentic manner; and therefore not by any men, or body of men, who make themselves personally responsible, as principals, for the acts of those to whom they profess to delegate the power.

All this pretended delegation of power having been made secretly—that is, only by secret ballot—not a single one of all the legislators, so-called, who profess to be exercising only a delegated power, has himself any legal knowledge, or can offer any legal proof, as to who the particular individuals were, who delegated it to him. And having no power to identify the individuals who professed to delegate the power to him, he cannot show any legal proof that any body ever even attempted or pretended to delegate it to him.

Plainly a man, who exercises any arbitrary dominion over other men, and who claims to be exercising only a delegated power, but cannot show who his principals are, nor, consequently, [6] prove that he has any principals, must be presumed, both in law and reason, to have no principals; and therefore to be exercising no power but his own. And having, of right, no such power of his own, he is, both in law and reason, a naked usurper.

Sir, a secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is a government by conspiracy; in which the people at large can have no rights. And that is the only government we now have. It is the government of which you are a voluntary member, and supporter, and yet you claim to be an honest man. If you are an honest man, is not your honesty that of a thoughtless, ignorant man, who merely drifts with the current, instead of exercising any judgment of his own?

For still another reason, all legislators, so-called, under the Constitution of the United States, are exercising simply an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion of their own; and not any authority that has been delegated, or pretended to have been delegated, to them. And that reason is, that the Constitution itself (Art. 1, Sec. 6) prescribes that:—

“For any speech or debate [or vote] in either house, they [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned [held to any legal responsibility] in any other place.”

This provision makes the legislators constitutionally irresponsible to anybody; either to those on whom they exercise their power, or to those who may have, either openly or secretly, attempted or pretended to delegate power to them. And men, who are legally responsible to nobody for their acts, cannot truly be said to be the agents of any body, or to be exercising any power but their own: for all real agents are necessarily responsible both to those on whom they act, and to those for whom they act.

To say that the people of this country ever have bound, or ever could bind, themselves by any contract whatever—the [7] Constitution, or any other—to thus give away all their natural rights of property, liberty, and life, into the hands of a few men—a mere conclave—and that they should make it a part of the contract itself that these few men should be held legally irresponsible for the disposal they should make of those rights, is an utter absurdity. It is to say that they have bound themselves, and that they could bind themselves, by an utterly idiotic and suicidal contract.

If such a contract had ever been made by one private individual to another, and had been signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowledged, and delivered, with all possible legal formalities, no decent court on earth—certainly none in this country—would have regarded it, for a moment, as conveying any right, or delegating any power, or as having the slightest legal validity, or obligation.

For all the reasons now given, and for still others that might be given, the legislative power now exercised by Congress, is, in both law and reason, a purely personal, arbitrary, irresponsible, usurped dominion on the part of the legislators themselves, and not a power delegated to them by anybody.

Yet under the pretence that this instrument gives them the right of an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over the whole people of the United States, Congress has now gone on, for ninety years and more, filling great volumes with laws of their own device, which the people at large have never read, nor even seen, nor ever will read or see; and of whose legal meanings it is morally impossible that they should ever know any thing. Congress has never dared to require the people even to read these laws. Had it done so, the oppression would have been an intolerable one; and the people, rather than endure it, would have either rebelled, and overthrown the government, or would have fled the country. Yet these laws, which Congress has not dared to require the people even to read, it has compelled them, at the point of the bayonet, to obey.

[8]

And this moral, and legal, and political monstrosity is the kind of government which Congress claims that the Constitution authorizes it to impose upon the people.

Sir, can you say that such an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion as this, over the properties, liberties, and lives of fifty millions of people—or even over the property, liberty, or life of any one of those fifty millions—can be justified on any reason whatever? If not, with what color of truth can you say that you yourself, or anybody else, can act as a legislator, under the Constitution of the United States, and yet be an honest man?

To say that the arbitrary and irresponsible dominion, that is exercised by Congress, has been delegated to it by the Constitution, and not solely by the secret ballots of the voters for the time being, is the height of absurdity; for what is the Constitution? It is, at best, a writing that was drawn up more than ninety years ago; was assented to at the time only by a small number of men; generally those few white male adults who had prescribed amounts of property; probably not more than two hundred thousand in all; or one in twenty of the whole population.

Those men have been long since dead. They never had any right of arbitrary dominion over even their contemporaries; and they never had any over us. Their wills or wishes have no more rightful authority over us, than have the wills or wishes of men who lived before the flood. They never personally signed, sealed, acknowledged, or delivered, or dared to sign, seal, acknowledge, or deliver, the instrument which they imposed upon the country as law. They never, in any open and authentic manner, bound even themselves to obey it, or made themselves personally responsible for the acts of their so-called agents under it. They had no natural right to impose it, as law, upon a single human being. The whole proceeding was a pure usurpation.

[9]

In practice, the Constitution has been an utter fraud from the beginning. Professing to have been “ordained and established” by “We, the people of the United States,” it has never been submitted to them, as individuals, for their voluntary acceptance or rejection. They have never been asked to sign, seal, acknowledge, or deliver it, as their free act and deed. They have never signed, sealed, acknowledged, or delivered it, or promised, or laid themselves under any kind of obligation, to obey it. Very few of them have ever read, or even seen it; or ever will read or see it. Of its legal meaning (if it can be said to have any) they really know nothing; and never did, nor ever will, know any thing.

Why is it, Sir, that such an instrument as the Constitution, for which nobody has been responsible, and of which few persons have ever known any thing, has been suffered to stand, for the last ninety years, and to be used for such audacious and criminal purposes? It is solely because it has been sustained by the same kind of conspiracy as that by which it was established; that is, by the wealth and the power of those few who were to profit by the arbitrary dominion it was assumed to give them over others. While the poor, the weak, and the ignorant, who were to be cheated, plundered, and enslaved by it, have been told, and some of them doubtless made to believe, that it is a sacred instrument, designed for the preservation of their rights.

These cheated, plundered, and enslaved persons have been made to feel, if not to believe, that the Constitution had such miraculous power, that it could authorize the majority (or even a plurality) of the male adults, for the time being—a majority numbering at this time, say, five millions in all—to exercise, through their agents, secretly appointed, an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over the properties, liberties, and lives of the whole fifty millions; and that these fifty millions have no rightful alternative but to submit all their rights to this arbitrary [10] dominion, or suffer such confiscation, imprisonment, or death as this secretly appointed, irresponsible cabal, of so-called legislators, should see fit to resort to for the maintenance of its power.

As might have been expected, and as was, to a large degree, at least, intended, this Constitution has been used from the beginning by ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, to enable them to maintain, at the point of the bayonet, an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over those who were too ignorant and too weak to protect themselves against the conspirators who had thus combined to deceive, plunder, and enslave them.

Do you really think, Sir, that such a constitution as this can avail to justify those who, like yourself, are engaged in enforcing it? Is it not plain, rather, that the members of Congress, as a legislative body, whether they are conscious of it, or not, are, in reality, a mere cabal of swindlers, usurpers, tyrants, and robbers? Is it not plain that they are stupendous blockheads, if they imagine that they are anything else than such a cabal? or that their so-called laws impose the least obligation upon anybody?

If you have never before looked at this matter in this light, I ask you to do so now. And in the hope to aid you in doing so candidly, and to some useful purpose, I take the liberty to mail for you a pamphlet entitled:

“Natural Law; or the Science of Justice; a Treatise on Natural Law, Natural Justice, Natural Rights, Natural Liberty, and Natural Society; Showing That All Legislation Whatsoever Is an Absurdity, A Usurpation, and a Crime. Part I.

In this pamphlet, I have endeavored to controvert distinctly the proposition that, by any possible process whatever, any man, or body of men, can become possessed of any right of arbitrary dominion over other men, or other men’s property; [11] or, consequently, any right whatever to make any law whatever, of their own—distinct from the law of nature—and compel any other men to obey it.

I trust I need not suspect you, as a legislator under the Constitution, and claiming to be an honest man, of any desire to evade the issue presented in this pamphlet. If you shall see fit to meet it, I hope you will excuse me for suggesting that—to avoid verbiage, and everything indefinite—you give at least a single specimen of a law that either heretofore has been made, or that you conceive it possible for legislators to make—that is, some law of their own device—that either has been, or shall be, really and truly obligatory upon other persons, and which such other persons have been, or may be, rightfully compelled to obey.

If you can either find or devise any such law, I trust you will make it known, that it may be examined, and the question of its obligation be fairly settled in the popular mind.

But if it should happen that you can neither find such a law in the existing statute books of the United States, nor, in your own mind, conceive of such a law as possible under the Constitution, I give you leave to find it, if that be possible, in the constitution or statute book of any other people that now exist, or ever have existed, on the earth.

If, finally, you shall find no such law, anywhere, nor be able to conceive of any such law yourself, I take the liberty to suggest that it is your imperative duty to submit the question to your associate legislators; and, if they can give no light on the subject, that you call upon them to burn all the existing statute books of the United States, and then to go home and content themselves with the exercise of only such rights and powers as nature has given to them in common with the rest of mankind.

LYSANDER SPOONER.
Boston,
May 27, 1882.

return to the discussion of consent; return to the beginning of the letter;