by: david-james

DVLA

the registration number is said to be owned by a corporation sole; the claimed owner is fiction, and can not cross into reality;

the owner written in the record

INF46 excerpt in which man kind attribute vehicle identification and ownership of registration numbers to the Secretary of State and write that numbers are allocated to vehicles and may be withdrawn
source: INF46; man kind write that all registration numbers are owned by the Secretary of State — personation;

the registration number is not the acrylic or metal plate and it is not the vehicle; it is an incorporeal statutory identifier; in section 23 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, “the registration mark for the time being assigned to a vehicle”;

  1. registration number or mark
  2. man kind attribute ownership to the eternal continuing Secretary of State office
  3. the alleged owner is the corporate office, not man kind
  4. the corporate office is a corporation sole: an artificial person; fiction

man kind wrote the ownership statement in INF46; man kind did not name man kind as owner; the continuing Secretary of State office, the alleged owner, is the corporate office, not man kind; it is imaginary, and as such does not exist;

source record

source document INF46, man kind wrote that all registration numbers are owned by the Secretary of State; in paragraph 138 of Khan, Singh LJ wrote that “Secretary of State” is a distinct legal concept and corporation sole;

conclusion

man kind attribute an artificial registration mark to an artificial continuing office of Secretary of State, neither of which exist in reality, and can not relate to a car; the alleged owner is not man kind; in reality, the registration number and vehicle, are without claim, and can not be the car or number plate that you have in the real world; this car can not be anything to do with DVLA, UK, or Secretary of State;

why corporation sole is fiction

“…shall be, by that name, a corporation sole, with a corporate seal.” Secretary of State for Transport Order 1976, article 4(1);

in article 4, man kind put the then office-holder and successors under one continuing corporate name; in paragraphs (2) to (4), man kind provided for man kind to authenticate, sign, or execute instruments; man kind supplied the name, succession, seal, and legal attribution; no man who owns was revealed;

“‘Secretary of State’ is a distinct legal concept, being a corporation sole.” Khan v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] EWCA Civ 41, paragraph 138;
“artificial persons are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, chapter 18;

Blackstone, a man, called those artificial persons corporations or bodies politic; he recorded that man kind devise the construction; no man, by writing, makes that imaginary construction into a man or brings it into reality; it has no natural body, awareness, will, voice, or deed;

  • bodynone;
  • awarenessnone;
  • will or voicenone;
  • deednone;
a name + successors + a corporate seal = an artificial person, not man;

no man quoted above used the PB conclusion “fiction” for this transport office; “fiction” is the PB conclusion applied here from the artificial-person and corporate-continuity wording; the imaginary office can not speak, possess, or do, and fiction can not cross into reality;

where DVLA fits

“The DVLA is an executive agency of the Department for Transport and has no separate legal personality from that Department.” DVLA KADOE contract, clause A4.2;

in clause A1.1, man kind named the contracting party as the Secretary of State for Transport acting through DVLA; in clause A4.2, man kind wrote that DVLA has no separate legal personality from the Department; man kind use the DVLA name for the administrative structure and for man kind authorised within it;

registration mark an incorporeal identifier which man kind assign to a vehicle under the written statutory scheme;
'owner' named in INF46 Secretary of State: a distinct legal concept and corporation sole;
DVLA executive agency-name; in the contract, man kind wrote that it has no separate legal personality;
Department for Transport ministerial department-name; not man kind;
Secretary of State office-name and distinct legal concept; in source writing, it is called a corporation sole;
corporation sole artificial continuity device devised by man kind to treat successive office-holders under one name;
man the man whose deeds are observable: he writes, signs, records, decides, sends, demands, withholds, receives, or uses the paper;

the observable cause

  1. a man decides or does
  2. the man writes, signs, records, or sends
  3. the man uses an officer role and the DVLA name
  4. the man writes “DVLA decided” or “DVLA requires”

by writing that final sentence, the man hides the deeds he does and personates the imaginary agency-name as having done them; man kind may attribute legal consequence to an office-name, but observable cause never leaves the man who did the deed; fiction can not cross into reality;

evidence ledger

below, man kind wrote how the names, functions, property, registration marks, and works are treated; man kind supplied no independent body, awareness, will, voice, or deed for DVLA or the alleged owner;

agency, department, office, and succession

from 1973, man kind used the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre name while registering and licensing drivers and new vehicles; from April 1990, man kind used the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency name for an executive agency of the Department of Transport; on GOV.UK, man kind list DfT as a ministerial department and DVLA as one of its executive agencies;

  • 1975in section 2, man kind wrote words permitting man kind to make a Secretary of State a corporation sole by Order; in section 3, man kind wrote statutory continuity for deeds which man kind did in relation to the named office;
  • 1976in article 4, man kind wrote the Secretary of State for Transport and successors, by that name, as a corporation sole with a corporate seal;
  • 1997 and 2001in later Orders, man kind wrote successor combined portfolio-names as corporations sole and carried functions, property, rights, and liabilities through those names;
  • 2002in the Order, man kind wrote the transfer of transport functions and connected property, rights, and liabilities to the Secretary of State for Transport and wrote statutory continuity;

man kind working under the DVLA name maintain records, issue or withhold licences and registration documents, assign or withdraw registration marks, receive notifications, and collect or enforce vehicle excise duty; man kind attribute each function to the names in writing, while each deed is done by a man;

registration marks and physical plates

in INF46, man kind wrote about ownership of the registration number, not the plate; in section 23 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, man kind used the language of a registration mark assigned to a vehicle; man kind thereby distinguished the statutory mark and entitlement from the physical plate and vehicle;

physical plate an acrylic or metal thing made and possessed by man kind;
registration mark an incorporeal identifier which man kind placed within the written statutory assignment scheme;
vehicle the physical thing, distinct from its mark, certificate, and registered-keeper description;
the former trading fund and Crown assets

in 2004, man kind made the DVLA Trading Fund Order, established a fund for DVLA operations, and called the allocated assets and liabilities Crown assets and liabilities; man kind did not incorporate DVLA as another person or create DVLA shares;

in 2011, man kind made the Revocation Order and ended the fund from 1 April 2011; in the Department for Transport explanatory memorandum, man kind wrote that trading funds are not separate legal entities and that DVLA remained an executive agency;

Crown copyright, works, and Blackstone
“Where a work is made by Her Majesty or by an officer or servant of the Crown in the course of his duties…” Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 163(1), original enacted wording;

in section 163, man kind wrote of a qualifying work; they did not write that the DVLA agency-name is a copyright work or corporation, nor that it lives or does a deed; a man makes the form, manual, guidance, software, photograph, diagram, publication, or arrangement; man kind then write that “Her Majesty” is first owner and call the copyright Crown copyright; man kind thereby attribute ownership to fiction after the man has done the deed; cause remains with the man;

William Blackstone, a man, wrote that artificial persons are “created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government” and called them corporations or bodies politic; those words are evidence that man kind devise the person, body, office, succession, and name, not proof that the device lives or does a deed;

Crown Acts stop fraud law

sources

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